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The Effect of Rational and Intuitive Decision-Making Strategies on Interest
Appraisals
Thomas C. Motl, University of North Dakota
Thomas S. Krieshok, University of Kansas
Karen D. Multon, University of Kansas

Abstract: Career counseling requires clients to make assessments and predictions of their
interests, necessitating the use of both rational and intuitive processes. Dual-processing models
of human decisionmaking have not been experimentally explored within the context of
vocational assessment. One-hundred thirty-six participants chose among eight
occupational/educational videos after an unconscious-intuitive, conscious-rational, or decisionas-usual information processing manipulation. Participant interest was assessed before, during,
and 2 weeks following the video in order to determine differences across conditions. The results
yielded three conclusions. First, the unconscious-intuitive manipulation resulted in interest
forecasts that were more predictive of actual interest than did the conscious-rational
manipulation or the decision-as-usual conditions. Second, interest levels were recalled more
accurately by participants who made choices under unconsciousintuitive conditions than by those
in the other two conditions. Finally, a history of occupational engagement was found to be
related to decisional quality but only for the control group. These results are discussed in the
context of vocational theory.
Keywords: decision-making, vocational psychology, vocational interests, interest forecasting,
rational, intuitive

Appropriateness of one’s career decisions has been an explicit component of most
prominent vocational theories (e.g., Holland, Sorensen, Clack, Nafziger, & Blum, 1973;
Krumboltz, 2009; Parsons, 1909; Super, 1980). Trait-factor matching, the most commonly
practiced technique in career counseling, explicitly promotes deliberate inspection of client
goals, values, and needs in order to determine the occupation with the greatest personal
congruence (Holland et al., 1973; James & Gilliland, 2003). Vocational psychologists who adopt
this paradigm often coach their clients through the deliberation process, in hopes that clients will
think more rigorously and systematically about themselves and their situation. This process often
invokes the pro and con “balance sheet” method of decision-making (Janis & Mann, 1977), or a
similar way of quantifying, calculating, and comparing internal experiences. When discussing
the role of strategic deliberation in career counseling, Krieshok (1998) noted that “all of the
available prescriptive models mandate self-knowledge” gained through introspection (p. 215).
But the hyperrational and introspective approach promoted by most career counseling practices
has been challenged by many current researchers (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson,
2002). Reflecting on two decades of research, Klein (2003) observed that the “thorough,
systematic, rational, and scientific” model of decision-making is “a myth . . . that simply does
not work very well in practice” (p. 20).
The goals of this article are to expand upon vocational theories that offer alternatives to
the reductionistic, rational, introspective approach implicit to many of our career assessments; to
introduce experimental methods that may be helpful to further explore vocational decisions
under controlled conditions; and to describe one experiment that yielded promising results. The
pertinent vocational theories (e.g., Krieshok, 2001) incorporate dual-processing models of human
cognition in order to integrate the career literature with modern decision-making research. An

overview of dual-processing models is presented before a discussion of pertinent vocational
theories, and a review of experimental designs commonly used to assess similar constructs.
An Introduction to Dual-Processing Theories of Decision-Making
Dual-processing theories assert that all cognitive work can be divided between two
discrete but interacting processes (Evans, 2008). These theories share a core assumption: there
are two information-processing systems that fluidly exchange information, share responsibilities,
and often have discrepant goals (Evans, 2008; Wilson, 2002). One system has been described as
conscious, controlled, rational, explicit, analytic, rule based, and higher order. Miller (1956)
famously quantified the capacity of this slow, effortful process as “seven, plus or minus two.”
The second system has a different set of characteristics: unconscious, automatic, heuristic,
intuitive, holistic, associative, and impulsive. This system is generally believed to be limitless
and presymbolic, meaning that it is not restricted by capacity or language (Evans, 2008). Dualprocessing theories have been applied to a variety of fields, including economics (heuristics and
biases; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), psychodynamic theory (cognitive-experiential self-theory;
Epstein, 1994), developmental psychology (fuzzy trace theory [FTT]; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995),
and social psychology (unconscious thought theory; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Crosstheoretical hallmarks of the processes will suffice as monikers: conscious-rational will denote the
former and unconscious-intuitive the latter.
The conscious-rational system is limited but has the ability to deal in abstraction. This
system is flexible but easily fooled by spurious information or overwhelmed by stimulus-rich
environments. Conversely, the unconscious-intuitive system is not limited by capacity or
language—it relies on gist, image, and emotion. Research has robustly supported the notion that

a nonconscious cognitive system exists and that it plays an indispensable role in human decisionmaking and goal setting (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).
Dual-processing models suggest conscious and nonconscious appraisals of self-related
constructs may be divergent or conflicting. For example, Melchior and Cheek (1990) found that
though most individuals who were shy during childhood had “grown out of it” during
adolescence, their selfnarratives oftentimes did not reflect this change. Greenwald and Farnham
(2000) measured implicit and explicit self-esteem and found that the two only weakly correlated
with one another and that implicit self-esteem was a better predictor of one’s response to failure.
Furthermore, individuals can employ new strategies based on information they are unaware they
have learned (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranell, & Damasio, 1997) and enact social repertoires
they are unaware they have developed (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). In such cases, an
individual’s consciously held story about their characteristics and abilities has diverged from
unconsciously driven behavior.
Wilson (2002) argues that the two processes can result in separate but stable
“personalities,” each functioning on its own information and strategies. Big decisions, such as
who to marry, where to live, or what job to take, are generally under the purview of the
conscious-rational personality. Deliberative, conscious-rational decisions are akin to one’s
identity, a socially constructed view of what one ought to do, think, and feel based on active selfstories and conscious self-evaluations. Unconscious-intuitive processes, on the other hand,
produce one’s reactions and feelings based on patterns of experience. This dualistic view has
substantial implications for vocational psychology, suggesting that interventions and instruments
focusing on explicit notions of self may be misleading (Krieshok, 1998). Wilson summarizes,
“When choosing a career, for example, it would be to people’s advantage to know whether their

unconscious personalities were better suited for a life as a lawyer, salesperson, or circus
performer” (p. 91).
Dual-Processing Models in Vocational Psychology
Making a career choice is precisely the type of decision that, according to most dualprocessing models (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Epstein, 1994; Wilson, 2002), should
place a premium on information generated and employed by the unconscious-intuitive thought
apparatus. However, vocational counseling theory, assessment, and practice emphasize
conscious, reductionist, and deliberative forecasting. For example, the Strong Interest Inventory
(Donnay & Borgen, 1996) and the Self-Directed Search (Holland, 1978) rely on an introspective,
conscious-rational approach to data collection and integration.
Krieshok’s (1998) “anti-introspectivist perspective” (AI) argues that interventions based
on introspection are theoretically problematic, and available career counseling techniques are
susceptible to cognitive distortions and forecasting errors. AI theories exist on a continuum.
Under the strictest AI approach, conscious thoughts, beliefs, and “will” have little or no bearing
on actions. Introspective efforts result in nothing more than a plausible account of why one has
acted the way one has, based on the most accessible (but not necessarily accurate) selfknowledge. Decisions based on these verbalized narratives are likely to be built on partial—and
potentially faulty—inferences. Career assessments, therefore, may reflect self-narratives that
have limited basis in reality or history. From this perspective, the cognitive process underlying
introspective tasks is more akin to self-fabrication than to self-exploration. If the strictest AI
approach is correct, career counselors would be well advised to avoid interventions that require
clients to explicitly introspect, quantify, and rank their preferences.

Less radical AI approaches view accurate self-reflection as difficult but not impossible to
achieve (Krieshok, 1998). This view recalls Freud’s famous iceberg metaphor: only a small
amount of mental life resides above the waterline of consciousness. The underlying mass is not
entirely inaccessible, but its discovery requires exploration and effort. Disciplined inquiry
through journaling, guided imagery, and counseling can aid this endeavor. These exercises can
yield valuable information regarding personal values and life themes, as long as clients adopt a
flexible and open approach to their previously held self-narratives.
AI theory suggests that, based on the dual-processing literature, the optimal strategy for
career exploration is to experientially engage in the possible occupations of interest (Krieshok,
2001). Direct experience in the world uses the full depth of information available to the
nonconscious system. Reading about the world and introspecting, as suggested by traditional
career counseling, activates only the narrow, superficial conscious-rational system. Krieshok,
Black, and McKay (2009) formulated the trilateral model of adaptive decision-making, which
postulates that both intuitive and rational processes are vital for adaptive career decision-making.
Neither process, however, can develop in a vacuum. The researchers termed the meaningful
activities that fund both intuitive and rational knowledge bases as “occupational engagement.”
Occupational engagement informs the decision-making process via direct experience.
The trilateral model of adaptive career decision-making (Krieshok et al., 2009) predicts that
activities which promote greater interaction (engagement) with the options of interest will lead to
more optimal choices. Behavioral engagement is fundamentally about immersing oneself with
the stimuli that accompany the options. The best way to determine how you will feel about a
certain job, major, or hobby is to truly “feel” it out, by developing gist-level affective responses
to a vast array of contextual cues, job-relevant tasks, and environmental feedback. Consciously

thinking about potential jobs is more engaging than nothing, but talking to those who have had
those jobs is better. Looking up information about a job on the Internet is more engaging than
nothing, but shadowing someone with that job for a day is better.
Experimental Methodology for Affective Forecasting
The trilateral model of adaptive career decision-making contends that occupational
engagement will inform both the conscious-rational and unconscious-intuitive systems,
improving one’s ability to predict the type and intensity of emotions that will arise as they
approach certain jobs or tasks. The process of emotional prediction is called affective forecasting
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Though it has yet to be applied to career-related issues, a substantial
research base has established experimental research methods that use dual-processing paradigms
to explore the conditions that optimize affective forecasts.
Experimental methods can reliably manipulate usage of the unconscious-intuitive and
consciousrational systems, effectively putting one or the other in the “driver’s seat” during the
decisionmaking process. Conscious-rational processes can be accentuated by asking an
individual to actively deliberate before making a choice (e.g., Wilson, 2002), or by creating a list
of positive and negative attributes based on the tasks or objects they are to decide between (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Conversely, it is possible to
overwhelm the conscious-rational system by forcing participants to engage in an ongoing mental
chore (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), by inducing immediate judgments (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
van Olden, 2006), or by measuring implicit associations (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998). Employing different forms of these procedures, both Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006)
and Levine, Halberstadt, and Goldstone (1996) have found that judgments and predictions made

under unconscious-intuitive conditions are more consistent, per test–retest reliability, than those
made under rational conditions.
Using these methods, researchers can determine what conditions produce the most
accurate affective forecasts (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). A hyperrational approach to these
forecasts—making a mental or physical list of “pros” and “cons,” for instance—actually
compounds the chances of errant conclusions, as prospecting about the effects of each subitem is
another opportunity for error (Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). Several research programs indicate
that promoting rational decision-making strategies reduces effectiveness (Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006; Gilbert, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Wilson, 2002; Wilson et al., 1993)
and that intuitive decisions produce superior outcomes (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2005;
Gilbert, 2006; Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).
An experiment performed by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) exemplifies the methods
and results common to dual-processing studies. Based on unconscious thought theory, the
researchers were investigating how three types of predecisional deliberation (immediate choice,
conscious thought, and unconscious thought) affect choice satisfaction. All participants viewed
five different artistic posters one at a time for 15 s each. After viewing, participants were
assigned to one of three conditions. Those in the immediate decision condition were shown all
options simultaneously and selected the poster they liked best. Those in the conscious thought
condition reviewed each poster individually and listed reasons why they liked and disliked each
poster before being shown all options simultaneously, and selecting the one they liked best.
Those in the unconscious thought condition were precluded from “thinking through” their choice
after viewing the posters by completing an anagram task for 450 s; after which they were
presented all options simultaneously and selected the poster they liked best. All participants,

regardless of condition, then rated their attitude toward the posters using a unipolar, unnumbered
50-point visual analog scale. Three to 5 weeks later, participants were again contacted and asked
about their satisfaction with the poster and the monetary value they placed on it. Results showed
that those in the unconscious thought condition were significantly more satisfied and placed a
higher value on the poster than either of the other conditions.
The methodology employed in the present study is the same basic paradigm used by
Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006). Procedures and materials were modified to emphasize
variables related to vocational assessment. Most importantly, participants were asked to forecast
feelings of interest instead of satisfaction. The assessment and prediction of interests is vital to
the field of vocational psychology, and many of the most commonly used instruments in the
field, such as the Strong Interest Inventory (Donnay & Borgen, 1996) and the Self-Directed
Search (Holland, 1978), rely on such forecasts. Although there is no precedent in the literature
for this specific form of affective prediction, there is no reason to believe that interest forecasts
would function any differently than other well-studied affective forecasting (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
van Olden, 2006, p. 20; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Interest forecasting
represents the merger between the practical realm of career counseling (interests) and the
experimental realm of dual-processing theory (affective forecasting).
The following experiment was designed to examine how a history of occupational
engagement and predecisional strategy (conscious-rational, unconscious-intuitive, or control)
affect how interest-relevant experiences are predicted and remembered. It is expected that a
history of occupational engagement will be related to accurate interest forecasts and that
unconscious-intuitive decisions will produce superior interest forecasts.

Method
Participants and Design
Participants included 136 students, 52 (38%) women and 84 (62%) men, from a large
Midwestern university. Mean age of the sample was 21.5 (SD ¼ 4.6), and 67% identified as
White, 11%as Black, 7% as Asian, 7% as multiracial, 4% as Hispanic, and 4% as another
ethnicity. All participants were offered a 10-dollar incentive and recruited from introductorylevel courses that meet general education requirements. As such, the sample consisted of
students with a variety of academic backgrounds: 52 different majors; 28% were first-year
students, 29% were sophomores, 20% were juniors, 16% were seniors, and 7% had exceeded 4
years of undergraduate education. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions: a control condition, an unconscious-intuitive condition, or a conscious-rational
condition. The conditions differed in predecisional strategy manipulation. All participants
completed measures, selected one of eight video options, watched the video they chose, and
rated their interest.
Measures and Materials
Occupational Engagement Scale-Student (OES-S). The OES-S is a 9-item instrument validated
by Cox, Krieshok, Bjornsen, and Zumbo (2015) as a measure of college student occupational
engagement. Engagement is a theoretical extension of the trilateral model of adaptive career
decision-making (Krieshok et al., 2009) and measures previous work world–related behavior.
The measure has been shown to be reliable (α = .85) and has been found to be a valid measure of
occupational engagement in college populations (Cox et al., 2015). Internal consistency of the
OES-S in the current sample (α = .82) suggests sufficient reliability.

Video options. Eight occupational/educational videos served as the stimuli in the experiment.
Videos were 16- to 18-min lectures selected from the Technology, Entertainment, and Design
Conference series (known as “TED talks”), in which an expert or researcher discusses their
respective field. Video options were chosen based on focus group feedback and intended to
represent a variety of distinct topics that would be of interest to undergraduate students. Each
video was summarized with a set of five different standardized descriptions. To ensure the
descriptions were equal in information quality and quantity across video options, they were
standardized based on (a) the occupational field of the expert, (b) the general occupation-relevant
action discussed in the presentation, (c) the specific occupation-relevant action discussed in the
presentation, (d) the object studied by the expert, and (e) the goal or purpose of the expert’s
inquiry. See Table 1 for these descriptions.

Since there was no way to standardize the videos themselves, they varied somewhat in
characteristics unrelated to the content of the lecture, such as production value and lecture
features (e.g., use of humor, demonstrations). As such, participant appraisals of the video reflect
their reaction to both the topic of the video—which were the basis of the participant prediction
and the focus of this study—and these peripheral video characteristics, which also influenced
participant interest levels. To account for such differences, during-video interest levels from all
participants who chose a particular video were averaged to obtain a general “video quality”
metric for each video option. Video quality scores ranged from 38.33 to 46.60, and this variable
was used as a covariate in an attempt to nullify potentially confounding video attributes.
Measuring interest. Interest was assessed using an unnumbered unipolar visual analog scale with
each end labeled “not at all interested” and “very interested.” Interest items were scored with a
standardized template to quantify the participant’s response from 0 (not at all interested) to 50
(very interested). This measure was used with success by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006),
who adopted this measurement style due to its sensitivity to subtle nonconscious affective
changes.
Mood assessment. Participant mood was assessed using a single item designed to be congruent
with other measures in the study: a 50-point unipolar visual analog scale. Single-item visual
analog scales have been found to be valid measures of mood (Williams, Morlock, & Feltner,
2010). Hirt, Melton, McDonald, and Harackiewicz (1996) found that pretask mood was a
significant predictor of interest both before and after participants engaged in a variety of
experimental tasks. The inclusion of this item allowed for the control of mood effects that might
obscure results.

Procedure
The procedure was modeled largely after the previously described experiment by Dijksterhuis
and van Olden (2006). Participants completed the study in groups of between four and seven
participants at a time. All participants, regardless of condition, completed the OES-S, current
mood assessment, and a short demographic questionnaire. Each participant completed a
predecisional manipulation before selecting one of the eight video options. Predecisional
manipulations, which are described below, differed between experimental conditions. Before
watching the video, they were asked to predict how interested they would be while watching the
video. They watched the video and rated their interest in it 3 times throughout: after 5 min of
video, after 10 min of video, and immediately following the video. These three measurements
were averaged to get a single “during-video interest” metric. Participants were contacted two
weeks later and asked to rate how interested they felt during the video.
Experimental manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
control (n = 44), conscious-rational (n = 44), or unconscious-intuitive (n = 48). Sample sizes are
equivalent or greater than those in similar studies (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson
et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).
Control condition. Participants in the control condition were presented all video
descriptions simultaneously and in an organized fashion (using the data in Table 1). They
selected the video they believed they would find most interesting. They watched the video they
selected and rated their interest levels 3 times throughout.
Conscious-rational condition. Participants in the conscious-rational conditionwere asked
to rate each of the 40 video descriptions using a 9-point Likert-type scale. They then tallied each

video total, yielding a single interest score for each video. Pilot testing showed that participants
needed approximately 5 min to complete the description ratings. Participants were presented all
video descriptions simultaneously and in an organized fashion and asked to select the video that
would be most interesting. Though they were free to choose any video, a review of participant
protocols found that all participants in this condition selected the video that they rated as most
interesting using the Likert-type scales. This method was intended to induce a hyperrational,
reductionistic decision-making strategy and simulate the methods and instruments that are very
common in career counseling. Participants in the conscious-rational condition then watched the
video they chose and rated their interest levels 3 times throughout.
Unconscious-intuitive condition. Before being asked to choose between videos,
participants in this group were presented the descriptions of the videos via computer program.
For instance, one description read as follows: “VIDEO A: Medicine.” Each of the 40
descriptions was flashed on the screen for 3 s at a time. This process was repeated, so that
participants watched the presentation for a total of 4½ min, seeing each video description for 3 s
twice. Participants were given instructions not to attempt to memorize these descriptions but to
“remain attentive and attempt to absorb the information.” After this, they were given a 5-min
distracter task consisting of solving anagrams. Anagram words were selected from the

emotionally neutral words cataloged in the affective norms for English words (word list (Bradley
& Lang, 1999). This anagram distracter task was intended to allow for unconscious thought and
the development of affective, gist-level appraisals of the options. Participants were presented all
video descriptions simultaneously and in an organized fashion and asked to select the video that
would be most interesting. They then watched the video they chose and rated their interest levels
3 times throughout.
Follow-up. Approximately 2 weeks following the initial data collection, participants were asked
to reread the descriptions of the videos and rate how interested they remembered feeling during
the video. Interest levels at follow-up were assessed using the same unnumbered visual analog
scale. Of the 136 initial participants, 115 (85%) completed the follow-up survey.

Results
An initial screening of the data revealed that during-video and follow-up interest variables were
found to have a significant negative skew. Gamst, Meyers, and Guarino (2008) recommend
eliminating outliers with z-scores greater than ±2.5 in order to normalize data prior to analysis.
Four participants (one from the control group, one from the conscious-rational group, and two
from the unconscious-intuitive group) were found to have z-scores greater than ±3.0. These four
scores were considerably more extreme than other cases in the data set; as the next most extreme
score had a z-score of −1.78. Plots and descriptive statistics suggested that, following the
elimination of these cases, the data distributions were sufficiently normally distributed for all
outcome variables. Two participants omitted important variables, and another did not follow
directions during the experiment. A total of 129 usable participant cases remained for analysis.

One-way analyses of variance found age, college grade point average, number of college
credits, OES-S score, and mood did not differ among groups, and a χ2 test for goodness of fit
indicated that the video options were chosen at the same rate across experimental groups.
Together, these results suggest random assignment was successful, and experimental condition
did not affect mood.
A correlation matrix of the primary variables examined in this study is presented in Table
2. Similar to the findings of Hirt et al. (1996), participant mood was found to be significantly
related to during-video interest appraisals, r(127) = .36, p < .001. Video quality was also found
to be related to during-video interest appraisals, r(127) = .34, p < .001. In addition, a one-way
analysis of variance found that there were significant differences across video quality scores,
F(7, 121) = 2.22, p = .037, η2 = .11. These two variables—both extraneous to the research
questions—exerted considerable influence on the dependent variables in the study. As such, they
were statistically controlled for in the following analyses.

Engagement and Interest
Partial correlations controlling for participant mood and video quality were performed to explore
the relation between during-video interest and engagement. Using the entire sample, partial

correlations between OES-S scores and during-video interest levels were significant, r(125) =
.23, p = .011. Further analysis, however, indicated that while these variables correlated in the
predicted direction for all three conditions, that relation was significant only in the control group,
r(37) = .39, p = .013, and not in the conscious-rational group, r(39) = .17, p = .292, or the
unconscious-intuitive group, r(41) = .21, p = .181 (Table 3).
Interest Forecast Accuracy
During-video interest levels were analyzed across conditions using an analysis of covariance
controlling for participant mood and video quality. A main effect for treatment condition was not
found, F(2, 130) = 1.40, p = .23. In addition, a partial correlation controlling for the effects of
participant mood and video quality revealed a significant and positive relationship, r(124) = .29,
p = .001, between prevideo interest and during-video interest in the sample overall. When
treatment groups were analyzed independently, however, only the unconscious-intuitive group
displayed a significant relationship between prevideo and during-video interest ratings, r(40) =
.53, p = .001; whereas the control, r(37) = .22, p = .176, and conscious-rational, r(39) = .17, p =
.303, conditions did not.
Interest Levels Over Time
Interest levels were examined across the 3 times: before the video (Time 1), an average of three
interest assessments made during the video (Time 2), and 2 weeks following the video (Time 3).
Raw mean interest scores were adjusted to control for mood, video quality, and OES-S scores.
OESS scores were included as a covariate due to the significant correlation between engagement
and interest levels unevenly distributed across groups. A 3 × 3 (group × time) repeated-measures
analysis of covariance was conducted on the data, which required Greenhouse–Geisser-corrected

degrees of freedom to compensate for a violation of the assumption of sphericity. A significant
interaction between group and time did not appear, F(2.46, 133.98) = .62, p = .75; nor did a main
effect for group, F(2, 108) = 1.70, p = .31. Finally, a significant main effect emerged for time,
F(1.23, 130.43) = 8.51, p = .002, partial η2 = .13. Post hoc analyses using a Bonferroni correction
revealed that the overall sample displayed a distinct “inverted V” pattern across time: There was
a significant increase in mean interest scores from Time 1 (M = 38.4, SD = 4.35) to Time 2 (M =
40.39, SD = 4.93), p = .03; and a significant decrease from Time 2 to Time 3 (M = 39.10, SD =
5.38), p = .001. The difference between Time 1 and Time 3 was not significant, p = 1.00.
Additional analyses of covariance controlling for mood, video quality, and OES-S were
conducted for each group to further examine the significant main effect for time. All follow-up
tests also used Bonferroni corrections to control for alpha inflation. The control group (N = 38)
displayed the same pattern as the overall sample: a main effect for time, F(1.27, 43.05) = 4.70, p
= .03, partial η2 = .12, with a significant decline in interest levels from Time 2 (M = 38.25, SD =

10.07) to Time 3 (M = 36.47, SD = 10.52), p = .02; but no difference between Time 1 (M =
37.21, SD = 8.43) and Time 3, p = 1.00. The conscious-rational group (N = 39) displayed the
same pattern: a main effect for time, F(1.22, 42.69) = 3.52, p = .04, partial η2 = .09, with a
significant decline in interest levels from Time 2 (M = 41.05, SD = 6.85) to those at Time 3 (M =
39.54, SD = 8.69), p = .01; but no difference between Time 1 (M = 39.36, SD = 5.68) and Time
3, p = 1.00.
Using the same statistical procedure, the unconscious-intuitive group (N = 37) did not
display a main effect for time, F(1.22, 40.31) = 1.77, ns, and unlike the control and consciousrational groups, there was no significant decline between Time 2 (M = 41.86, SD = 7.96) and
Time 3 (M = 41.27, SD = 8.63), ns. Also, the difference between Time 1 (M = 38.62, SD = 8.45)
and Time 3 (M = 41.27, SD = 8.65) was greater than in either of the other two groups, and the
increase approached significance, p = .09. See Figure 1 for a graphic representation of the pattern
of interest scores over time for the three conditions.

Discussion
The methods in this study were designed to foster three different decisional strategies.
Those in the control condition had no structure or motivation to adopt any specific deliberative
strategy. Those in the conscious-rational decision were prompted to adopt a reductionistic,
hyperrational, and quantitative decisional strategy that is similar to that required by many current
vocational interest assessments. Those in the unconscious-intuitive condition were immersed in
decision-relevant stimuli but were precluded from conscious deliberation by way of a distractor
task.

OES-S scores were positively correlated with reported interest levels during the video.
These results offer general support for the idea that occupational engagement, as measured by
the OES-S, is related to better interest forecasting as measured by during-video interest in
participant video of choice. However, after controlling for potentially confounding variables (i.e.,
participant mood and video quality), the association was only significant for the control group.
Though it is possible that a trait propensity to find activities interesting is responsible for
this relationship, this explanation would not account for the differential effects across the
conditions. If high occupational engagement scores represent a latent personality variable, such
as extroversion, it would be expected that the relationship would be observed across all groups.
The relation between the two variables most likely represents, as operationalized, an
association between past engagement behaviors and ability to forecast interests under usual
conditions. When participants were left to their own devices, a history of occupational
engagement displayed a positive relationship of moderate strength with the accuracy of interest
forecasts.
These results offer tentative support for the contention that engagement is beneficial in
immediate, “decision-as-usual” situations; those in which typical, idiosyncratic patterns of
interaction with decision-relevant stimuli are not interrupted. Under such circumstances, it
appears that previous engagement activities may be associated with better occupational or
educational decisions. This interpretation also suggests that occupational engagement informs
the process used to produce daily interest forecasts, a finding that supports Krieshok et al.’s
(2009) definition of the construct and Cox et al.’s (2015) operationalization of it.

Interest forecast accuracy was measured two ways. First, actual interest levels assessed
during the video were used as a metric to determine the extent to which the video that was
chosen reflected the “best choice.” Thus, greater interest levels during that video, after specific
contextual and characterological factors were controlled, can be interpreted as better predictions.
Using this metric, results did not indicate that decisional strategy (control, conscious-rational, or
unconscious-intuitive) significantly influenced success of interest forecasts.
A second measure of interest forecast accuracy was calculated by examining the
correlations between prevideo predictions and during-video interest scores. The strength of this
relationship serves as a metric to determine the degree to which interest forecasts actually
predicted future interest levels; accurate forecasts would be expected to correlate strongly and
positively to actual interest levels. Only members of the unconscious-intuitive group reported
interest forecasts that reliably predicted their actual interest levels. It appears unconsciousintuitive procedures led to forecasts that were more predictive of actual interest than did either of
the other strategies.
As a whole, the sample displayed an “inverted V” pattern of interest over time.
Participants were surprised by their interest levels during the videos, as they were, on average,
more interested during the video than they expected they would be. When asked 2 weeks later,
however, they reported an interest level indistinguishable from their prevideo expectation and
significantly below that which they reported while watching their video. That is, after 2 weeks,
participants in the consciousrational and control groups significantly misremembered their
experience. They more closely recalled their expectation of the video than their experience of it.
Both the control condition and the conscious-rational condition displayed this pattern.

Participants in the unconscious-intuitive group were likewise pleasantly surprised by how
interested they were during their video, as indicated by a significant increase from prevideo to
during-video interest level. Unlike the other two groups, however, follow-up interest scores
decreased only slightly from during-video scores. In fact, follow-up interest scores were
indistinguishable from during-video scores, and considerably higher than their prevideo scores.
In contrast to the other conditions, participants in the unconscious-intuitive condition more
closely recalled their experience of the video, than their expectation of it.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that one’s predecisional strategy may have
effects beyond simply influencing which option is chosen. In this case, the manner in which one
contemplated an occupational/educational decision appears to have influenced how accurately
one recalled internal states (i.e., interest levels) during that event. It is certain that decision
makers in the conscious-rational condition—and likely that those in the control condition—
produced conscious, rational, and logical reasons for their interest forecasts. Although this may
not necessarily have resulted in significantly poorer choices, it may have significantly altered
their recollections of the outcomes of those choices.
When one approaches a choice by activating a logical narrative (i.e., a conscious-rational
interest forecast), they create two separate and potentially competing experiences: the act of
consciously constructing a forecast and the experience of the event itself. Two weeks later, when
the descriptions of the videos were represented and participants were asked for a single
evaluation of the memory, the logic behind the prediction was easily recalled, as neither the selfnarratives nor the video descriptions had changed. Logico-verbal rules are generalized, resulting
in consistency across situations (e.g., “I am the type of person who would be interested in this”),
even if such consistency comes at the cost of accuracy. Those individuals in the unconscious-

intuitive group would not have had a well-formed rationale to compete with their experience.
Instead, the unconscious-intuitive condition created a vague, gist-level, affective response to
each option, rather than discrete reasons for selecting an option.
This interpretation of the findings is consistent with several dual-processing theories. For
example, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) asserted that “the experiential system
operates in a context-specific manner,” while “responses influenced by the rational system,
which operates according to context-free, abstract principles, should be more cross-situationally
consistent” (p. 393). From this perspective, the misremembering displayed by the consciousrational and control groups resulted from an overgeneralization of narrative self-knowledge (e.g.,
“I am the type of person who would like this”). FTT suggests that information that is processed
and gestated at the gist level is more easily and accurately recalled than information processed at
a specific, verbatim level. FTT stipulates that gistlevel experiences are more amenable to
meaning making than are verbatim data (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). In the current study, the
unconscious-intuitive group was forced to form gist-level appraisals of the options through the
stimulus immersion procedure (exposing participants to the descriptors for 3 s each) and
prevented from conscious, verbatim processing through the anagram distracter task.

Conclusions
In total, the findings from this study suggest that the manner in which individuals process
relevant information preceding a decision, in the form of engagement and decisional strategy,
will influence interest forecasts and recollections of interest levels during experiences. Three
specific conclusions are worth noting:

1. A history of engagement behavior was found to be helpful when making decisions
without structure (i.e., decisions-as-usual).
2. Though an unconscious-intuitive strategy was not found to produce definitively better
choices, it appeared to produce interest forecasts that were more predictive of actual
interest than did conscious-rational or control strategies.
3. Conscious-rational and control strategies resulted in recollections of events that were
different from what was experienced and similar to what was expected. An
unconscious-intuitive strategy resulted in the opposite: recollections that were similar
to what was experienced and different from what was expected.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are limitations to the current study. First, in general, tests of between-group mean
differences across experimental conditions, while often significant and in the predicted direction,
were not as persuasive as expected. External validity was prioritized; potency and control were
sacrificed for ecological legitimacy and generalizability. Replication studies, particularly as they
relate to the prediction and memory of interest appraisals, may emphasize experimental control
to boost power and potency. Specifically, though methods were designed to induce a particular
information processing strategy prior to a decision, there was no manipulation check regarding
how participants actually went about deciding among videos. Future studies may circumvent this
problem by exerting greater experimental control. Lastly, the outcome of participant’s choice
was of little consequence, as they were informed the video would only last about 15 min, which
certainly mitigated participants’ appraisal of interest. A boring video may be considered slightly
uninteresting (i.e., a fairly poor choice), but a boring job that consumes 40 hr each week would
likely be considered incredibly uninteresting (i.e., a very poor choice). Introducing outcomes of

greater importance could increase variability among cases, highlighting differences in decisional
quality. In general, it is hoped that the theory and methodology introduced here will inspire
further exploration of interest appraisals in the light of modern decision-making theory.
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